SINCERITY AND TRANSMISSION

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Abstract. According to some theories of testimonial knowledge, testimony can allow you, as a knowing speaker, to transmit your knowledge to me. A question in the epistemology of testimony concerns whether or not the acquisition of testimonial knowledge depends on the speaker’s testimony being sincere. In this paper, I outline two notions of sincerity and argue that, construed in a certain way, transmission theorists should endorse the claim that the acquisition of testimonial knowledge requires sincerity.

1.

This paper considers whether or not a speaker’s testimony being sincere is a necessary condition of a listener acquiring testimonial knowledge. In this paper I’ll be working from within the framework provided by transmission theories of testimonial knowledge. I’ll argue that, within this framework, we should think that the acquisition of testimonial knowledge requires the speaker’s sincerity. But the story isn’t quite so straightforward. In §2, I’ll distinguish between two notions of sincerity. In §3, I’ll argue that one of them, which involves a speaker saying something that expresses her justification for what she says, is necessary for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge. In §4, I’ll turn to consider the consequences of this view. I’ll do this by considering some interesting cases in the existing epistemological literature concerning testimony. I’ll also argue that these considerations show that transmission can be defended against would-be counterexamples.

Before all of this, however, it’s important to understand the framework from within which I’ll be working. Unfortunately, I don’t have space to argue for a transmission theory here. But I’ll set out the basics of what it amounts to, because this much is important to this paper’s central argument.

The central idea behind transmission theories of testimonial knowledge can be encapsulated in the following claim:

K-TRANS In believing a speaker’s testimony that \( p \), a listener can come to acquire a speaker’s knowledge that \( p \).

This is the very basic idea of what a transmission theory amounts to. The idea is that if I, a knowledgeable speaker, tell you that \( p \) and you believe me, then you can come to acquire my knowledge that \( p \). It’s not just the case that you can also come to know \( \text{what I know} \). All theories of testimony think this. What’s distinctive about K-TRANS is the idea that you can actually acquire \( \text{my knowledge} \) by believing my testimony.

Of course, this is all well and good, but understanding transmission theories requires something more. We need to understand what you acquiring my knowledge amounts to. The key to understanding this is in terms of justification transmission. The idea is that, if my testimony that \( p \) transmits my knowledge that \( p \) to you, then

Thanks to Paul Faulkner and Miranda Fricker.
your belief that \( p \) comes to be supported by my justification for \( p \). And this can be expressed in the following principle:

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J\text{-TRANS} \quad \text{In believing a speaker’s testimony that } p, \text{ a listener’s belief that } p \text{ can come to be supported by the speaker’s justification for } p.
\]

So knowledge transmission is to be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of justification transmission. The transmission theory offered by Tyler Burge (1993; 1997) and developed by Paul Faulkner (2011) explains knowledge transmission in terms of justification transmission.

A few more remarks on transmission theories are in order at this juncture. The first point to note is that transmission theorists needn’t think that the transmission mechanisms described in K-\text{TRANS} and J-\text{TRANS} respectively are the only ways in which testimony can yield knowledge and justified belief. They are, for instance, perfectly at liberty to think that a listener might use a speaker’s testimony to infer the truth of what she says, in the same way that someone might infer the age of a tree from the number of rings inside it.\(^1\) Transmission theorists can think that this is a way of coming to know or form justified beliefs by using a speaker’s testimony, whilst still thinking that the transmission mechanisms described in K-\text{TRANS} and J-\text{TRANS} respectively are another, distinct, way.

In the same way that transmission theorists do not have to deny the legitimacy of inferring something from a speaker’s testimony, they also do not have to deny the legitimacy of relying on a speaker in the way that one might rely on an instrument. It’s perfectly compatible with the transmission mechanisms K-\text{TRANS} and J-\text{TRANS} that, sometimes, a listener might simply treat a speaker as a reliable source of true statements and believe what she says with an implicit presumption merely that she is reliable.\(^2\)

So transmission theorists needn’t think that K-\text{TRANS} and J-\text{TRANS} describe the only ways in which testimony serves to provide knowledge and justified belief. But they do have to think that it provides one way that testimony can yield knowledge and justified belief. And furthermore, they have to claim that it’s a way of yielding knowledge and justified belief that cannot be reduced to one of the other ways. Lastly, they have to think that this kind of justification is only made available by testimony. This is what makes transmission theories distinctive.

The second important point is that, if transmission theorists go in for the view that testimony can yield knowledge and justified belief in more than one way, then they need to distinguish between the kind of knowledge and justified belief that can only be had by believing testimony and the knowledge and justified belief from testimony that is of the same kind as that which can be had from natural signs, or instruments. The idea is that, whilst testimony \textit{can} bring us to know things or form justified beliefs in the way that natural signs or instruments can, testimony can also bring us to know things and form justified beliefs in ways that natural signs and instruments can’t—in the ways that K-\text{TRANS} and J-\text{TRANS} describe.

In this spirit, transmission theories distinguish between \textit{testimonial knowledge} and \textit{testimonial justification}, which is knowledge and justification acquired in ways distinctive to testimony (through transmission) and \textit{knowledge from testimony} and \textit{justification from testimony}, which cover the other ways of forming knowledge and justified beliefs.

\[\text{1}\text{Faulkner (2011) does this.}\]
\[\text{2}\text{I’ve argued for this in Wright (2014).}\]
through testimony. Distinguishing between these locutions is distinctive to transmission theories. As Jennifer Lackey (2008) observes, most epistemological theories of testimony treat them as interchangeable. But that’s because most epistemological theories think that testimony only yields knowledge and justified belief in one way, whether that way is in terms of reliability, as Lackey argues, along with Sanford Goldberg (2010), Peter Graham (2000a; 2000b; 2006) and Ernest Sosa (2010) or in terms of inference, as Elizabeth Fricker’s (1994; 1995) earlier work along with work from Jonathan Adler (2002), Jack Lyons (1997) and Tomoji Shogenji (2006) argues. Transmission theories think that there’s a way in which we can acquire knowledge and form justified beliefs that’s distinctive to testimony. And they reserve the locutions testimonial knowledge and testimonial justification for this kind of knowledge and justification.

With this in hand, we’re in a position to see much more clearly the question that this paper is investigating. Assuming that transmission theorists accept, as Burge and Faulkner do, that there’s more than one way for a listener to know from a speaker’s testimony, then it seems fairly straightforward that a speaker’s testimony being sincere is not a necessary condition on a listener acquiring knowledge from testimony. Suppose that a transmission theorist allows that beliefs can amount to knowledge by being reliably formed. Forming a belief in a speaker’s testimony that amounts to knowledge in virtue of this clearly doesn’t require sincerity from the speaker. Lackey’s consistent liar is such a case. In consistent liar, a speaker is systematically confused, in such a way that she believes that $p$ when $\neg p$ is the case and then systematically lies about it, so that she says $p$ when she believes that $\neg p$. Her confusion and her insincerity combine in such a way that her statements are a reliable guide to the truth (Lackey, 2008, p. 53).

Transmission theorists that think that a belief can amount to knowledge in virtue of being reliably formed should think that believing the speaker in Lackey’s consistent liar case can yield knowledge. The knowledge it yields is knowledge from testimony rather than testimonial knowledge, but it’s knowledge all the same. So knowledge from testimony doesn’t require sincerity, since there’s no sense in which the speaker in Lackey’s consistent liar case speaks sincerely. And the same applies to a transmission theorist who thinks that a listener can come to know the truth of what a speaker says by inferring it from her testimony.

Suppose that someone had observed the speaker in Lackey’s consistent liar case over an extended period of time and observed that $p$ was generally true when she said that $p$. In doing so, the observer builds up a large stock of inductive evidence that the speaker’s testimony (with respect to $p$) is generally true. It seems that, upon hearing a future instance of testimony that $p$ from the speaker, the observer might well infer the truth of $p$ in a way that yields knowledge.$^3$

The point is, for transmission theorists that think that there are more ways of knowing from testimony than simply by acquiring the speaker’s knowledge in the way that K-trans describes, it’s straightforward enough that a speaker’s testimony being sincere isn’t a necessary condition on a listener acquiring knowledge from testimony. The question here is whether or not a speaker’s testimony being sincere is a necessary condition on a listener acquiring testimonial knowledge, understood as knowledge supported by transmitted justification. And I argue that it isn’t.

$^3$According to Faulkner, this is the only way in which a listener might acquire knowledge in the consistent liar case (Faulkner, 2011, p. 71).
We now have transmission theories in view. In this section, I propose to identify two distinct notions of sincerity. Rather than arguing for one, I propose to identify the one necessary for the transmission of knowledge and justification.

A natural starting point for thinking about sincerity is the thought that your testimony is sincere only if you say something you believe. But whilst it might be natural to think that you believing that $p$ is a necessary condition of your testimony that $p$ being sincere, it doesn’t seem that it’s sufficient. If you believe that $p$, but say that $p$ for some other reason, then your testimony that $p$ isn’t sincere. To see this, think about a case in which you encounter a car salesman, who wants to sell a particular car. As it happens, the particular car is the best one for you and the salesman knows this. But the salesman tells you that *this is the best car for you* in order to sell you the car. He’d have said this to someone even if it wasn’t true. Faulkner presents this kind of testimony as the general model of telling—as an act primarily intended to induce beliefs in a listener (Faulkner, 2011, p.5). Lackey discusses a similar case, called ALMOST A LIAR, which I will return to in §4.

The idea is that sincerity requires more than just believing that $p$ and saying that $p$. The belief has to be causally connected to the testimony. It can’t simply be the case that the belief is causally inert in the production of the speaker’s testimony. The salesman’s testimony isn’t sincere because, whilst he believes that the car is the best one for you, this has nothing to do with why he said it. He said it just to get you to believe it. These kind of considerations yield the following account of sincerity, according to which sincerity is a matter of the connection between the speaker’s belief and her testimony:

S\textit{\textsc{tn-b}} A speaker’s testimony that $p$ is sincere if and only if the speaker says that $p$ because she believes that $p$.

According to S\textit{\textsc{tn-b}}, the speaker’s testimony must be caused by her belief if it is to be sincere. Obviously, as with any account appealing to a causal relation, there will be a worry about deviant causal chains. But I propose to leave this aside for the purposes of this paper. The account of sincerity given by S\textit{\textsc{tn-b}} is similar to the belief expression model of assertion given by David Owens (2006), according to which to assert that $p$ is to express one’s belief that $p$. According to Owens:

One can express a belief in action by making an assertion or one can do it by behaving in a way which constitutes a natural sign of belief (sounds, gestures etc.). One thing these actions have in common is that they are directly motivated by the belief rather than by the belief that one has it (a higher-order belief which may be true or false) (Owens, 2006, pp. 108-109).

Where someone expresses her belief, in the sense that Owens describes here, her testimony is sincere in the sense that S\textit{\textsc{tn-b}} describes. But one might think that S\textit{\textsc{tn-b}} isn’t the only meaningful sense of sincerity. This is brought out by considering the following type of case, from Lackey:

\textsc{distraught doctor}: A doctor understands that all of the scientific evidence indicates that there is no connection between vaccines and autism. However, after his child was diagnosed with autism shortly after receiving her vaccines, the doctor’s grief causes him to abandon his belief that there’s no connection between vaccines
and autism. When asked by one of his patients, however, about whether or not there’s a connection between vaccines and autism, the doctor tells her that there isn’t a connection. He does this because he realises that this is what the evidence best supports and takes himself to have a duty to say whatever the evidence best supports (Lackey, 2008, pp. 110-111).

Now, it’s clear that the doctor’s testimony in DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR isn’t sincere in the sense that SIN-B describes. The doctor says something that he doesn’t believe so it can’t be the case that his testimony is caused by his having the corresponding belief, in the way that SIN-B describes. Nonetheless, I think that there’s a genuine and important (to transmission) sense in which the doctor’s testimony is sincere.

It’s fairly clear that the doctor has propositional justification for what he says. Whilst he doesn’t believe what he says, he is in a position to form the corresponding justified belief. If he formed the corresponding belief on the basis of the evidence he has available to him, then his belief would be justified by this evidence. And it’s stipulated in DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR that the doctor says what he does because he has justification for it. He presents what is (by his lights) most likely to be true and he does so exactly because it is (by his lights) most likely to be true. In Owens’ terms, he expresses his justification. This, I think, means that there’s a sense in which the doctor’s testimony can correctly be thought of as sincere, even though it isn’t sincere by the lights of SIN-B.

This gives rise to an alternative account of sincerity, which can be encapsulated in the following:

\[ \text{SIN-J} \]
\[ \text{A speaker’s testimony that } p \text{ is sincere if and only if the speaker’s testimony that } p \text{ is caused by her justification for } p. \]

I think that the account of sincerity given in SIN-J captures the intuition that there’s a genuine sense in which the doctor’s testimony in DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR is sincere. So there’s a sense of sincerity according to which a speaker’s testimony that \( p \) can be sincere even though she doesn’t believe that \( p \). It can be sincere, in the sense that SIN-J describes.

We now have two distinct notions of sincerity in hand, one involving a speaker saying that \( p \) because she believes that \( p \), given by SIN-B, and one involving a speaker saying that \( p \) because she has justification for \( p \), given by SIN-J. In the next section, I propose to argue that a speaker’s testimony being sincere in the latter sense is a necessary condition on a listener’s belief in a speaker’s testimony amounting to testimonial knowledge or being supported by testimonial justification.

3.

A listener’s belief amounting to testimonial knowledge involves it being based on the speaker’s justification for what she says. So testimonial knowledge requires justification transmission. Transmission theories are thus theories about the epistemic basing relation. Faulkner expresses transmission in these terms. According to Faulkner ‘what makes the transmission principles true is the fact that the warranted uptake of testimony is a mechanism for basing belief on a speaker’s evidence’ (Faulkner, 2011, pp. 107). Once it becomes clear that transmission is a matter of the epistemic basing relation, however, I think that a case emerges for thinking that a speaker’s testimony being sincere, in the sense given by SIN-J, is a necessary condition on the transmission of justification.
Ordinarily, it’s natural to think that the epistemic basing relation is a causal relation of some sort. Beliefs need to be connected somehow to the things that justify them. Suppose that I look at a thermometer and see that it says that the temperature is 19°C. It might be the case that I have various reasons for thinking that the thermometer is working, that thermometers generally are a good guide to the temperature and 19°C is a plausible account of what the temperature might be. But if my belief isn’t in some sense caused by the fact that I have these reasons, then it seems that they don’t do anything to justify my belief. The mere having of reasons doesn’t make my beliefs justified. It makes me propositionally justified, which is to say that it means that I’m in a position to form a justified belief. But unless I actually use the reasons, my belief isn’t justified by those reasons.

Something similar applies in the case of testimony. If a listener has various good reasons for thinking that a speaker’s testimony is true, but doesn’t actually use these in forming her belief, then her belief isn’t justified by these reasons. Intuitively, a listener who has various good reasons for thinking that a speaker’s testimony is true but doesn’t actually use them in forming her belief is no better off, in terms of justified beliefs, than someone who doesn’t have them at all. There’s a difference in terms of propositional justification, but this doesn’t translate into a difference in terms of the justification of beliefs.

In the same way that a listener’s background reasons justify her belief only if her belief is based on these reasons, there needs to be a causal connection between the speaker’s justification and the listener’s belief for the listener’s belief to be supported by the speaker’s justification for what she says. And the relevant causal connection can be in place if and only if the speaker’s testimony is sincere in the sense that Stn-J describes.

Where the speaker’s testimony that \( p \) is sincere in the sense that Stn-J describes, the speaker says that \( p \) because she has justification for \( p \). If the listener then believes that \( p \) because the speaker said that \( p \), the listener ultimately believes that \( p \) because of the speaker’s justification for \( p \). In virtue of being caused by the speaker’s justification for \( p \), the speaker’s testimony that \( p \) connects the listener’s belief that \( p \) to the speaker’s justification for \( p \). In this way, the sincerity described in Stn-J makes a speaker’s justification available to a listener. Transmission thus requires sincerity in the sense that Stn-J identifies.

By contrast, sincerity in the sense that Stn-B describes is neither necessary nor sufficient for making a speaker’s justification available to a listener. It isn’t necessary for justification transmission because a speaker might say that \( p \) because she has justification for \( p \) and thereby do the required work to allow the listener’s belief to be causally connected to her justification even if she doesn’t believe that \( p \) and is thus insincere in the sense that Stn-B identifies. In addition, the sense of sincerity in Stn-B fails to be sufficient to make a speaker’s justification available to a listener because the speaker might be sincere in the sense that Stn-B describes, but lack justification for what she says.

All of this amounts to a case for thinking that there’s a sense of sincerity in which a speaker’s testimony being sincere is necessary for a listener’s belief being supported by her justification for what she says. The sense in question is the one given by Stn-J. The idea is that a belief being supported by some sort of justification depends on the

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\footnote{Obviously, the basing relation isn’t just any causal connection. But I won’t get into the details of the connection in this paper. A plausible account is given by John Turri (2011).}
belief being based on (which is to say, causally connected in the correct way to) the justification. In the case of transmitted justification, this requires a causal connection between the speaker’s justification and the listener’s belief. This connection is secured by the kind of sincerity described by Stn-J, which connects the speaker’s justification to her testimony. Hence transmission requires sincerity in the sense that Stn-J describes.

Thus far, the discussion has proceeded on a fairly abstract level. This has been quite deliberate. The point here is that there are theoretical considerations that motivate the claim that transmission requires sincerity in the sense given by Stn-J. These come from considering the epistemic basing relation. In the next section, I’ll illustrate further the idea that justification transmission requires the kind of sincerity that Stn-J describes using some cases from literature. The cases help explain the idea that I’ve been developing here, but I don’t want to suggest that the case for thinking that justification transmission requires sincerity in the form of Stn-J depends in any sense on intuitions about these cases. So whilst the cases are illustrative and show the strength of transmission theories, it’s important to be clear that there’s a motivation for the sincerity Stn-J identifies as a necessary condition on justification transmission that appeals to theoretical considerations rather than intuitions.

4.

The point that I have been making is that the acquisition of testimonial knowledge and justification requires sincerity in the sense that Stn-J describes. As observed in §1, this is important for two reasons. The first is that it’s important to understand what transmission theories amount to and what they are committed to thinking. The second is that, once we get clear on what transmission theories amount to, we can see that certain objections to them are ultimately unsuccessful. In this section, I consider cases from the literature that bring out both of these points.

Consider the following case:

**Gossip:** A knowledgeable speaker tells a gossip that \( p \) because she knows that \( p \) and wants to inform the gossip that \( p \). The gossip doesn’t believe that \( p \), but sees a listener and decides to tell her that \( p \) because she knows that it will upset the listener. The gossip thus tells the listener that \( p \).

Faulkner thinks that transmission theories should allow that the gossip’s testimony can transmit justification to the listener. The idea is that testimonial justification is available to the listener because there is a causal connection between the original speaker’s justification for \( p \) and her testimony that \( p \) (since she sought to inform the gossip with her testimony). The gossip thus has propositional justification for \( p \) and this is passed to the listener by her testimony. So Faulkner claims that a belief based on the gossip’s testimony could be supported by testimonial justification.

The discussion that I’ve given above, however, suggests that transmission theories have a framework for resisting this verdict. In Gossip, there isn’t a causal connection between the gossip having justification for \( p \) and her saying that \( p \). Since the gossip’s intention is to upset the listener, she doesn’t say that \( p \) because she has justification

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5This counts as gossip for our purposes here. Coady (2006) discusses the nature of gossip further, but the nuances of what counts as gossip aren’t important here.
for \( p \), but because she thinks that telling the listener that \( p \) will upset her. The gossip’s testimony that \( p \) is thus not sincere in the sense that Stn-J describes and since the listener forms her belief by believing the gossip, the listener’s belief also isn’t connected to the gossip’s testimony.

So there is, I think, good reason for thinking that transmission theories shouldn’t think that gossip, in the sense outlined in Gossip, makes testimonial knowledge and justification available to a listener. The idea is that the requirements of the basing relation, that the listener’s belief be causally connected to what justifies it, just aren’t the case in Gossip. This type of gossip doesn’t express justification and therefore doesn’t connect the listener’s belief to the speaker’s justification.

Of course, one might object that there is a sense in which the gossip says that \( p \) because the speaker saying that \( p \) gave her the idea of upsetting the listener by saying that \( p \) and try to reconnect the gossip’s testimony with the original speaker’s justification in this way. But this is just the wrong type of causal connection. The gossip’s testimony doesn’t express her justification and there’s thus a sense in which her testimony isn’t causally connected to her justification, as the speaker’s testimony in Distraught Doctor is.

If this is correct, however, then it’s natural to wonder why anyone should have thought that cases like Gossip involved justification transmission in the first place. One reason for thinking that the case in Gossip involves the transmission of justification comes from considering an alternative case that has been made against transmission theories. Consider the following:

CREATIONIST TEACHER: A teacher believes in creationism. But she knows that her belief is based on faith and held in the face of good countervailing evidence, which she is familiar with. Because she believes that the correct thing to tell her class is what the evolutionary evidence supports, she tells her class the facts of evolution. The class believe what she says (Lackey, 2008, p. 48).

The idea is that Creationist Teacher creates a problem for transmission theories because the schoolteacher doesn’t know what she says but the listening class can come to know by believing her. Faulkner’s response is to claim that knowledge can skip a link in a testimonial chain. The idea is that, the sources that the teacher consults do express knowledge and this knowledge is passed from the teacher’s sources to the class via the teacher’s testimony (Faulkner, 2011, p. 61).

But this means that one must allow that justification can be transmitted even when the speaker doesn’t believe what she says. And if transmission theories allow this possibility in the Creationist Teacher case, then it looks like they also have to allow that it’s possible in the Gossip case. Or at any rate, they have to explain why it isn’t.

There is such an explanation available, though. The Gossip case and the Creationist Teacher case aren’t alike with respect to the kind of sincerity identified in Stn-J. The speaker’s testimony in the Creationist Teacher case is sincere in the sense of Stn-J where the speaker’s testimony in the Gossip case isn’t. The schoolteacher tells her class about evolution exactly because she realises that this is what the evidence best supports. Her testimony is thus sincere in the sense that Stn-J describes and believing her testimony thus establishes a causal connection between the listener’s belief and the speaker’s justification for what she says. This isn’t true in the

\[^6\]Other similar cases come from Graham (2006) and Carter and Nickel (2014).
goSSIP case and the result is that there’s a difference between the cases that can support an explanation of why the CREATIONIST TEACHER case can involve justification transmission but the goSSIP case can’t.

I stated in §3 that considering the application of the ideas behind transmission and the basing relation illustrated both what transmission theories are committed to and also how they can respond to certain case-based objections. The above shows that transmission theories aren’t committed to thinking that the CREATIONIST TEACHER case needs to be treated in the same way as the goSSIP case. Thinking about transmission in terms of the basing relation also yields an account of how transmission theories can deal with the following case:

ALMOST A LIAR: A speaker knows that \( p \) and tells a listener that \( p \). However, the speaker says that \( p \) not because she knows that \( p \) but because having the listener believe that \( p \) is in the speaker’s interests. So even if the speaker didn’t know that \( p \), or even didn’t believe that \( p \), she would still have told the listener that \( p \). The listener comes believe that \( p \) by taking the speaker’s word for it (Lackey, 2008, p. 69).

The case is similar to the salesman case from §2. Like the salesman case, the speaker says something she knows, but she says it because she has a particular practical interest in mind. She thus isn’t primarily interested in whether or not the listener forms a true belief, or one for which there’s evidential support available, but she’s primarily interested in having the listener believe that \( p \), whether or not it’s true.

The idea is that the ALMOST A LIAR case presents a problem for transmission theories. The speaker has justification for what she says and the listener believes her, but it’s intuitive that the listener’s belief is unjustified. The problem that Lackey presents for transmission theorists is how to explain this. Lackey argues that the listener’s belief in ALMOST A LIAR is intuitively unjustified because the speaker’s testimony isn’t truth-conducive in any meaningful sense, but if justification can be passed from speaker to listener, then it’s hard to see how transmission theories return an unjustified verdict (Lackey, 2008, pp. 69-70). If we think that, ordinarily, a speaker’s justification can be transmitted to a listener, in cases such as CREATIONIST TEACHER, then we need some principled account of why transmission doesn’t happen in the ALMOST A LIAR case.

Fortunately, however, considering the relationship between sincerity in the sense that Sin-J identifies and transmission shows why transmission theorists have a straightforward answer to this problem. The speaker in CREATIONIST TEACHER is sincere in the sense that Sin-J identifies where the speaker in ALMOST A LIAR is not. The result of the sincerity in the CREATIONIST TEACHER case is that speaker’s testimony expresses her justification. This isn’t true in the ALMOST A LIAR case, so there isn’t a causal connection between the speaker’s justification and her testimony, in the same way that there isn’t in the goSSIP case. This means that transmission theorists can make a principled difference between the CREATIONIST TEACHER case and the ALMOST A LIAR case.

The connection between sincerity and testimonial justification is an important one for transmission theories. According to transmission theories, testimony can yield justified belief by a listener acquiring a speaker’s justification for what she says.
This idea is at the heart of justification transmission and the idea of justification transmission is also fundamental to the idea of knowledge transmission. To say that a listener can pick up on a speaker’s knowledge is just to say that the listener’s belief can amount to knowledge in virtue of being supported by justification transmitted from the speaker. I’ve been arguing that transmission theorists should think that the transmission of justification requires the sincerity of the speaker’s testimony, at least in a certain sense.

Ordinarily, the idea behind the epistemic basing relation is that, if a reason is causally disconnected from someone’s belief, then it doesn’t justify her belief. This applies to the epistemology of testimony when we think of justification transmission as a way of a listener’s belief being based on a speaker’s justification. In a case where the speaker’s justification is causally disconnected from her testimony, it’s hard to see how there can be any meaningful connection between the speaker’s justification and the listener’s belief. So it’s natural for transmission theorists to hold is that justification being transmitted from speaker to listener depends on the speaker’s justification for what she says being causally connected in the right way to her testimony.

Where a speaker’s testimony is causally connected to her justification by expressing her justification, this can be regarded as a form of sincerity. This is expressed in S\(\text{S-TM}\). And with this notion of sincerity in hand, we can make sense of a connection between sincerity and testimonial justification, as transmission theorists conceive of it. The speaker’s testimony being sincere in the sense that S\(\text{S-TM}\) describes is a necessary condition of the listener’s belief being supported by testimonial justification. This isn’t to say that transmission theorists think that this (or any) kind of sincerity is a necessary condition of a listener’s belief being justified, because transmission theorists can allow that beliefs based on testimony can be justified in ways that don’t involve transmission. But a listener’s belief being supported by distinctively testimonial justification, understood in terms of transmission, requires sincerity in terms of a causal connection between the speaker’s testimony and her justification for what she says.

References


